Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header Managing Space Weather Risk : A Wicked Problem Nancy K. Hayden* March 11‐12, 2013 OGawa, Canada *With Contribu,ons from Dr. Bill Tedeschi, Dr. Daniel Pless, Dr. Kevin Stamber, Dr. Michael Bernard Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. SAND NO. 2013-1784 C High Consequence Problems Managing High Consequence, Low Frequency DisrupOve Events The key is to better understand the future—plan to change it, and change it Integrated Knowledge Logistics Infrastructure Analysis Red Teams Games Exercises Social/ Psychological Simulation Scenariodriven hypothesis indications & warnings Effective communication Threat Increase Resilience MOADB enhanced collection smart decision making Reduce Threat and Impacts Reality: Risk individuals and groups Crisis Management Restoration/Recovery Wicked Problems 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. There is no defini,ve formula,on of the problem. There is no end to the problem. Solu,ons are not true‐or‐false, but good‐or‐bad. There is no immediate and no ul,mate test of a solu,on to the problem. Every solu,on to the problem is a “one‐shot opera,on” ‐‐ there is no opportunity to learn by trial‐and‐error, every aLempt counts significantly. 6. There is not an enumerable (or an exhaus,vely describable) set of poten,al solu,ons, nor is there a well‐described set of permissible opera,ons that may be incorporated into a plan. 7. Every instan,a,on of the problem is essen,ally unique. 8. The problem is actually a symptom of another problem. 9. The existence of discrepancies when represen,ng the problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explana,on determines the nature of the problem’s resolu,on. 10. The planner has no right to be wrong. Complexity Principle Characteristics I. Complex systems are wholes with irreducible properties that emerge from the interaction and interdependence among its parts: Measuring Complexity varying degrees of organization – or structure, regularity, symmetry and intricacy – in a systems’ behavior or its architecture. EMERGENCE III. Purposeful complex systems create themselves in response to self-creativity in other systems: INNOVATION, TRANSFORMATION IV. Complex systems are coordinating interfaces in Nature’s holarchy: SYSTEM of SYSTEMS Structural Complexity II. Complex systems that are purposeful are capable of maintaining themselves and initiating action to achieve goals in a changing environment: ADAPTIVE Innovation Surprise Unpredictable 0 Randomness 1 Lessons Learned: Risk Management of Natural Disasters* Severity impact exposure vulnerability extremes dynamic temporal spatial scales economic social geographic demographic cultural institutional governance Analysis Approaches environmental future vulnerability resilience coping adaptive capacity Data lacking local level Inequalities constraints Framework driven primarily by normative perspectives *”Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters To Advance Climate Change Adaptation,”, United Nations Environmental Program and World Meteorological Organization, 2012 Infrastructure Resilience Framework 1. Define System(s) Absorptive Capacity Adaptive Capacity Restorative Capacity 2. Define Scenario(s) Resilience 3. Define Metrics Recovery Effort System Performance System Performance Recovery Duration Systemic Impact time Recovery Effort 4. Obtain Data Total Recovery Effort time 5. Calculate Resilience Costs 6. Perform Qualitative Assessment Framework driven primarily by economic perspectives Flow of NaOonal Assets U n c e r t a i n t y Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n S e n s i t i v i t y A n a l y s i s Framework driven primarily by regulatory perspectives What are the metrics? How much data do we have to work with? Who needs the answer, when? What level of confidence is required? What is the cost of getting it wrong? Waterfalls and Fragmenta/on Preclude Taming of Wicked Problems Solutions require collective intelligence (coherence) integrated horizontally and transformed vertically across diverse enterprise perspectives Sources of Incoherence Based on ZachmanTM Enterprise Framework Framework driven primarily by organizational perspectives PuUng It All Together: Frame the Problem Analysis approach depends on what question is being asked, what fidelity is required, in what timeframe System Complexity Example: Criticality, Restoration Priorities, and Resiliency High fidelity physical modelsCausal analysis of individual elements Systems models: aggregate supply-demand and response to controlled interventions; optimization Question Epistemology Abstracted simulations identify schema-based vulnerabilities Ex: network topologies Risk‐Based Policy Analysis at Sandia  Physics‐Based Studies  IdenOfy and reduce vulnerabiliOes of naOonal security systems to EMP  OperaOons Research and ComputaOonal Analysis (ORCA) OpOmizaOon studies  Integrated stockpile opOmizaOon under resource constrained enterprise with uncertainty  NISAC policy studies    Improve understanding, preparaOon, and miOgaOon of consequences of infrastructure disrupOon Provide a common, comprehensive view of US infrastructure and response to disrupOons  Describe vulnerabiliOes of criOcal infrastructure  Predict policy opOons to prevent cascades  Explore cascading impacts of power outage  Predict economics of infrastructure recovery InternaOonal Security Studies  Explore impacts of climate change on migraOon  Explore organizaOonal learning and innovaOon  Predict emergence of leaders  Integrated CogniOve Systems  Behavior Influence Assessments Physics‐Based Understanding to Reduce Vulnerability Long History of Research  Integrated EM Effects Test and Analysis  Joint Voltage from Lightning Currents  Stockpile surety  Protec/ng the Planet  Asteroid threats  System level effects of exo‐atmospheric EMP  First Principles Simula/on of EMP at High Al/tude Electron flow in a Terawatt level transmission line  RadiaOon hardening of military systems microelectronics  Novel designs for improved, GPS‐satellite based, radiofrequency monitoring for EMP emissions  Results can be applied to early warning systems Sandia’s Z accelerator for high-energy density physics research Poten/al EMP Effects on US Infrastructure HITRAC/DHS Request 2012 KEY FINDINGS Component Interdependencies  Electric power systems are resilient and would likely be able to shift power distribution to backup configurations to accommodate local disruptions.  Component repairs would likely require 1 day to complete except for the loss of a large power transformer which requires in excess of 6 months to replace.  A solar storm could affect radio communications, such as satellite communication, commercial airliners, radio, TV, cellular and high-frequency communications signals. Hypothetical Interdependency Framework, EMP Commission Report 2008 Hurricane Planning and Response  Planning Scenarios  Pre-Landfall Infrastructure & Population Impacts  Post-Landfall Response & Recovery Issues Scenario-Based Consequence Analysis using Detailed Network Analysis and System Dynamics of Different Asset Classes and Sectors Earthquake planning and Response Earthquake Response & Recovery planning   Multiple scenarios Quantify regional and national impacts on population, critical infrastructure, economy Natural Gas & Petroleum Pipelines New Madrid Seismic Zone NG & petroleum pipelines break in areas of strongest shaking:   Midwest loses 25% of supply 60% after 3 weeks Long-term effects:   Mississippi River water transportation may be disrupted for months Significant disruption to transportation of bulk agricultural products, coals, minerals Mississippi River Impact Damaged locks damaged river (nonnavigable) damaged piers, wharves, quays Scenario-Based Consequence Analysis using Detailed Network Analysis, System Dynamics with Sensitivity Analysis to prioritize recovery actions a priori and “think outside box” for adaptive capacity Planning for H5N1 Pandemic Influenza Modeling & Analysis:  Community interactions (schools, workplace networks)  Assessed effectiveness of response strategies     Network of Infectious Contacts social distancing Vaccination High-performance computing used to run 10’s of millions of scenarios Discovered social distancing best minimized disease spread, especially closing schools Abstracted Agent Based Modeling, Derived Network Analysis, Stochastic Uncertainty Analysis Children and teens form the backbone of epidemic spread Power Outage: Cascading Impact on Telcom Systems and Emergency Services Scenario-Based Consequence Analysis using System Dynamics with Sensitivity Analysis to Plan Adaptive Emergency Response Capabilities Conrad et al (2006) Behavioral Influence Assessment (BIA) Informs High Consequence Decisions  BeGer understand and anOcipate the interplay between specific poliOcal/social organizaOons and general society (including its infrastructure) in response to potenOal event or acOons Structure  Synthesizes a set of of decision theories into a cogniOve‐system dynamic framework that captures the dynamics of individuals interacOng within groups and socieOes over Ome System Level Modeling Features  MulO‐scale and transparent assessment with quanOfiable uncertainty based on data, expert informaOon, and decision theories Impacts  Enables analysts to assess higher‐order (cascading) influences and reacOons to events, as well as determine the uncertainty that the event will produce the desired results over Ome Cogni/ve Level Models BIA Tool Can be Integrated With Others Leader Interac/ons Assessments to potentially answer:   What are the expected response behaviors within different cultural, social, and economic groups during and a`er a natural disaster? What are the Opping points that drive people to respond in counter‐producOve ways during natural disasters?  How could energy security concerns affect behaviors?  What are the long‐term effects of a natural disaster on groups? Groups Dynamics Example: Fukushima Disaster Assess perturba/ons within: • Social systems • LogisOcal networks • Ecological systems Environmental CondiOons Social/PoliOcal reacOons COMS Network Supply Network TransportaOon Network Lessons Learned from Policy Analysis Wicked Problems Are Hard, But Can Be “Tamed”  Conduct right analysis for different perspectives, data, timescales            Decide on question and risk metrics Simplify to essential components: more is not better Abstract up to multiple simultaneous scales and resolutions Plan how to communicate results clearly and timely - not optional Quantify/qualify interactions of political, health, social, economic and technical systems including uncertainties Couple socio-systems to physical systems Develop methods to handle data issues up front Analysis approaches include calibration, verification, validation Capture non-local, non-intuitive and interdependency effects Operationalize confidence and trust in decision support Always include Sense-Making in the process Summary: Taming Wicked Problems Requires a CASoS Descriptive/prescriptive experimentation and analysis to reduce vulnerability Cost/Benefit design analysis to improve system robustness Forecasting analysis to reduce likelihood of exposure Integrated Knowledge Logistics Infrastructure Analysis Social/ Psychological Simulation MOADB Red Teams, Games, Exercises Exploratory analysis to increase latent and adaptive capacities Threat Predictive analysis for minimizing cascading effects while enabling system recovery Increase Resilience Reduce Threat and Impacts Crisis Management Restoration/Recovery Present Reality: Reduced Risk Optimization analysis to radically improve system performance